Description
Book SynopsisConsistent with the literature on state building, failed states, peacekeeping and foreign assistance, this book argues that budgeting is a core state activity necessary for the operation of a functional government. Employing a historical institutionalist approach, this book first explores the Ottoman, British and Ba''athist origins of Iraq''s budgetary institutions. The book next examines American pre-war planning, the Coalition Provisional Authority''s rule-making and budgeting following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the mixed success of the Coalition''s capacity-building programs initiated throughout the occupation. This book sheds light on the problem of ''outsiders'' building states, contributes to a more comprehensive evaluation of the Coalition in Iraq, addresses the question of why Iraqis took ownership of some Coalition-generated institutions, and helps explain the nature of institutional change.
Table of Contents1. State building and the reconstruction of Iraq's budgetary institutions; 2. The evolution of Iraqi budgetary institutions from the Ottomans and the British mandate through Saddam; 3. Pre-war planning for Iraq's economic and budgetary reconstruction; 4. Boots on the ground: the CPA and the new Iraqi budgetary process; 5. Building Iraqi ministerial capacity: the case of FMIS; 6. The 17th benchmark and the challenge of Iraqi budget execution; 7. Building Iraqi budgetary capacity; 8. Iraqi budgeting; 9. Successful state building in Iraq? Lessons from the reconstruction of Iraq's budgetary institutions.
