Description
Book SynopsisRecchia draws on declassified documents and about one hundred interviews with civilian and military leaders to illuminate little-known aspects of U.S. decision making in the run-up to interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq.
Trade Review"In Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, Stefano Recchia addresses an important question: Why does the United States pursue multilateral military interventions when it ostensibly has the military capabilities to carry out these interventions on its own? Recchia's original answer to the question is an important contribution to the more general literature on military intervention and U.S. foreign policy in the post–Cold War era. Recchia conducted an impressive number of interviews with many of the key decision makers involved in the post–Cold War interventions about which he writes." -- David M. Edelstein, Georgetown University, author of
Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation"Like a skilled forensic scientist, Stefano Recchia dissects and refutes the conventional wisdom about how national security decisions are made in the U.S. By doing so, he contributes greatly not only to an understanding of 'How did it happen?' but even more importantly to how to create a mature national security process in the future." -- Gregory S. Newbold, Lieutenant General, USMC, Ret.
"The United States often seeks support from multilateral bodies like the UN Security Council and NATO before launching humanitarian interventions or using military force to change the political institutions of foreign nations. Why? Stefano Recchia in Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors puts forward an original answer to this enduring question. He shows that pro-force civilian policymakers often seek international authorization in order to mollify the government's chief reluctant warriors, for example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs, who for their part look to such external authorization as insurance that U.S. forces will enjoy foreign burden-sharing and sustained domestic political support. In exploring this subject Recchia is persuasive in presenting his own arguments; he is judicious in his engagement of alternative explanations; and he is rigorous in his deployment of a wide range of cases spanning the entire post-Cold War period. Scholars of international relations and specialists in foreign policy alike will welcome and build upon this book for years to come." -- Joseph M. Grieco, Duke University
"Stefano Recchia has done a masterful job documenting and analyzing the formulation of National Security Policy by the Principals of the National Security Council. His analysis is sound and he provides clear insight into all the arguments for the various courses of action advanced by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others involved in making recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief." -- Joseph Ralston, General (Ret), USAF, Former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Table of ContentsIntroduction: Multilateralism and the Generals1. The Value of Multilateral Legitimacy2. Institutions, Burden Sharing, and the American Military3. Haiti, 1993–94: Multilateral Approval to Ensure a UN Handoff4. Bosnia, 1992–95: Keeping the United States from "Owning" It5. Kosovo, 1998–99: Reassuring the Generals With NATO's Buy-In6. Iraq, 2002–3: Silence from the GeneralsConclusionAppendix: List of Officials Interviewed
References
Index
