Description
Book SynopsisWhy do states sometimes compete and wage war while at other times they cooperate and pursue peace? Does competition reflect pressures generated by the anarchic international system or rather states' own expansionist goals? This title offers a theory of international politics that identifies the kinds of variables that influence a state's strategy.
Trade ReviewHonorable Mention for the 2011 Best Book, International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association "This ambitious book offers a deductive theory of state security policies that builds on work by Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and Alexander Wendt. Unlike Waltz and like Wendt, Glaser contends that the anarchic structure of the international system does not automatically lead to competitive policies; cooperation is possible if states properly assess their rivals' motives... [T]his is an important work for serious students of security studies."--Choice "Glaser should be commended for demonstrating how even realist assumptions can lead to cooperative and peaceful outcomes in international politics. The manner in which he reaches these conclusions is also praiseworthy, particularly his attention to detail. Glaser interrogates important realist concepts and lays bare their conceptual and methodological shortcomings, before correcting or adapting them appropriately. This makes Glaser's restatement of realism the most sophisticated yet."--Benjamin Martin, Political Studies Review "Rational Theory of International Politics is an important book that should not be missed by those interested in IR. The book offers a comprehensive theory of rationalism which does much to forward the internal debates of the realist school. The analysis of material variables, where Glaser's mastery of the topic is evident, is the highlight of the book. Further, the extended analysis of information variables is a most welcome addition to a school that has largely ignored their importance."--Sophia Dingli, Millennium: Journal of International Studies
Table of ContentsPreface ix Chapter One: Introduction 1 Chapter Two: Setting Up the Theory 23 Chapter Three: The Theory 51 Chapter Four: Extensions of the Theory 93 Chapter Five: Counterarguments 127 Chapter Six: Placing the Theory in the IR Theory Landscape 148 Chapter Seven: Evaluating the Theory from Within 172 Chapter Eight: Evaluating the Theory--Important Cases and Useful Comparisons 206 Chapter Nine: Applying the Theory to Arms Races; Testing It with Counterfactuals 228 Chapter Ten: Summary and Policy Implications 269 Bibliography 283 Index 305
