Description

Book Synopsis
Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrovian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enumerate the various factors that are responsible for the stability of the voluntary association of free and rational individuals. Among other topics covered are an axiomatic characterisation of the concept of a rational choice, the simple majority decision rule and its extensions, the social choice implications of the concept of equity as nonenvy, the constrained majoritarian collective choice rules and the conflict between the Paretian ethics and the libertarian claims of individual rights.

Table of Contents
Preface; 1. Prologue; 2. Rational choice and revealed preference; 3. Arrovian impossibility theorems; 4. Simple majority rule and extensions; 5. The fairness-as-no-envy approach in social choice theory; 6. Impartiality and extended sympathy; 7. Individual rights and liberatarian claims; 8. Epilogue; Notes; Bibliography; Index.

Rational Choice Collective Decisions and Social

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    A Paperback by Kotaro Suzumura

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      Book details

      Publisher Cambridge University Press
      Published 11 May 2009
      ISBN-13 9780521122559
      978-0521122559
      ISBN-10 0521122554
      Also in:
      Social and ethical issues

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrovian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enumerate the various factors that are responsible for the stability of the voluntary association of free and rational individuals. Among other topics covered are an axiomatic characterisation of the concept of a rational choice, the simple majority decision rule and its extensions, the social choice implications of the concept of equity as nonenvy, the constrained majoritarian collective choice rules and the conflict between the Paretian ethics and the libertarian claims of individual rights.

      Table of Contents
      Preface; 1. Prologue; 2. Rational choice and revealed preference; 3. Arrovian impossibility theorems; 4. Simple majority rule and extensions; 5. The fairness-as-no-envy approach in social choice theory; 6. Impartiality and extended sympathy; 7. Individual rights and liberatarian claims; 8. Epilogue; Notes; Bibliography; Index.

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