Description
Book SynopsisThis illuminating title applies rational choice theory to the power debate, demonstrating the fallacious arguments of all sides. Power is analysed as a bargaining game where the power of actors is assessed in terms of the resources to which they have access. By distinguishing luck from power it shows that many groups widely regarded as powerful are merely lucky, albeit as a result of systematic features of society.
This is one of the first conceptual books on power directly to engage both classical and modern empirical debates on the power structure at both the local and national level.
Trade Review'This engaging book breathes new life into the rather sterile debate about power through the use of the tools of rational choice theory. In a refreshing shift of emphasis, Keith Dowding also challenges the standard antagonistic relationship between rational choice and structuralism by indicating how rationality can lie at the heart of structural theory. . . . a very interesting and important contribution to current debates both about power and the uses of rational choice theory.'Table of ContentsContents: 1. Introduction 2. Rational Choice and a Theory of Action 3. Preferences and Objective Interests 4. Political Power and Bargaining Theory 5. Collective Action and Dimensions of Power 6. State Power Structures 7. Preference Formation, Social Location and Ideology 8. Conclusions
