Description

Book Synopsis
Eli Hirsch is Charles Goldman Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis University, USA. He is the author of Dividing Reality (OUP, 1999) and Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology (OUP, 2011).

Trade Review
Hirsch's book is illuminating, it charts new territory, and lays out old territory in a new light. The Talmudic allusions are enlightening, and the narrative detours are entertaining . . . It is first-class philosophical literature. * Notre Dame Philosophical Review *
Hirsch has opened the way to ask such questions, important not only for philosophy but for humanity. * Philosophy in Review *

Table of Contents
Introduction I. Vatol’s anxiety Introduction to Lev’s question The example of Vatol Yitzhak’s reaction to skepticism, and Williamson’s On the nature of this work The “two-level” view of the impossibility of doubt The meaning of “reasons” to doubt Relationships between “doubt”, “belief”, “assertion”, and “certainty” Further connections between “doubt”, “anxiety”, and “knowledge” Interlude: Waiting for Godot A connection to Nagel’s skepticism Interlude: philosophy and comedy A challenge to Lev’s assumptions about epistemic anxiety II. Vatol and Us The n-to-n+1 argument A safety condition on belief Interlude: memories of Berkeley Pryor’s epistemic principle Distinction between one-level and two-level cases Interlude: Talmudic connections The “non-circularity” condition Daniel ‘s challenges to Yitzhak’s view Yitzhak’s stringent response to “entering a loop” Yitzhak’s Austinian answer to the problem of dreams Interlude: finding an “eitzah” Daniel’s two additional questions Summary Lev’s disagreement with Yitzhak III. The Impossibility of Doubt Lev’s past epistemic anxiety Interlude: Memories from Yeshiva Lev’s first argument for the impossibility of doubt The first premise of Lev’s first argument A question about valuing one’s life on the basis of probabilities A comparison of Lev’s position with Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s Interlude: Yitzhak’s tale Lev’s second argument The meaning of “having a self” Interlude: Yitzhak’s pride and shame Relationship between the notions of “self” and “identification” Broughton’s suggestion that Hume did not identity with his belief in an external reality Lev’s epistemic attitude Endnotes References

Radical Skepticism and the Shadow of Doubt

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    A Paperback / softback by Eli Hirsch

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      Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
      Publication Date: Publication Date: 28/12/2017
      ISBN13: 9781350033856, 978-1350033856
      ISBN10: 1350033855

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      Eli Hirsch is Charles Goldman Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis University, USA. He is the author of Dividing Reality (OUP, 1999) and Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology (OUP, 2011).

      Trade Review
      Hirsch's book is illuminating, it charts new territory, and lays out old territory in a new light. The Talmudic allusions are enlightening, and the narrative detours are entertaining . . . It is first-class philosophical literature. * Notre Dame Philosophical Review *
      Hirsch has opened the way to ask such questions, important not only for philosophy but for humanity. * Philosophy in Review *

      Table of Contents
      Introduction I. Vatol’s anxiety Introduction to Lev’s question The example of Vatol Yitzhak’s reaction to skepticism, and Williamson’s On the nature of this work The “two-level” view of the impossibility of doubt The meaning of “reasons” to doubt Relationships between “doubt”, “belief”, “assertion”, and “certainty” Further connections between “doubt”, “anxiety”, and “knowledge” Interlude: Waiting for Godot A connection to Nagel’s skepticism Interlude: philosophy and comedy A challenge to Lev’s assumptions about epistemic anxiety II. Vatol and Us The n-to-n+1 argument A safety condition on belief Interlude: memories of Berkeley Pryor’s epistemic principle Distinction between one-level and two-level cases Interlude: Talmudic connections The “non-circularity” condition Daniel ‘s challenges to Yitzhak’s view Yitzhak’s stringent response to “entering a loop” Yitzhak’s Austinian answer to the problem of dreams Interlude: finding an “eitzah” Daniel’s two additional questions Summary Lev’s disagreement with Yitzhak III. The Impossibility of Doubt Lev’s past epistemic anxiety Interlude: Memories from Yeshiva Lev’s first argument for the impossibility of doubt The first premise of Lev’s first argument A question about valuing one’s life on the basis of probabilities A comparison of Lev’s position with Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s Interlude: Yitzhak’s tale Lev’s second argument The meaning of “having a self” Interlude: Yitzhak’s pride and shame Relationship between the notions of “self” and “identification” Broughton’s suggestion that Hume did not identity with his belief in an external reality Lev’s epistemic attitude Endnotes References

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