Description
Book SynopsisForeign affairs practitioners and policy analysts claim that international arms embargoes usually fail due to the lack of political will among national governments to implement and enforce these restrictions. This volume confronts this critique directly, first by describing a more nuanced assessment of success, and then by presenting well-informed empirical and case-study chapters that reveal arms embargoes to be more effective than often understood. The chapters in this book examine some of the more complex cases of arms embargoes such as Iraq, Pakistan, Angola, Liberia and the Great Lakes region of Africa. Readers will find data and assessments not available in prior studies, as well as frameworks that can be replicated in future research. The book concludes with policy suggestions for how arms embargoes might be strengthened and their political objectives more readily attained.
Table of ContentsList of Contributors. Foreword. Introduction. Chapter 1 A framework for the analysis of the effectiveness of arms embargoes. Chapter 2 The unprecedented embargo: The UN arms sanctions against Iraq, 1990–2004. Chapter 3 The challenge of measuring success: Yugoslavia's sanctions decade (1991–2001). Chapter 4 US measures against Pakistan's nuclear policies, 1990–2001. Chapter 5 Tightening the screws in West African arms embargoes. Chapter 6 From failure to success: The impact of sanctions on Angola's civil war. Chapter 7 UN arms embargoes in the Great Lakes, 1994–2004. Chapter 8 Arms embargoes against Eritrea and Ethiopia. Chapter 9 A quantitative analysis of arms embargoes. Chapter 10 Putting teeth in the tiger: Policy conclusions for effective arms embargoes. Conflict management, peace economics and development. Putting Teeth in the Tiger: Improving the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes. Copyright page. About the Authors. List of Tables.
