Description
Book SynopsisReveals how targeting individual leaders for punishment rather than the nations they represent creates incentives for cooperation between nations and leaves room for future relations with pariah states. This book demonstrates that theories of leader punishment explain a great deal about international behavior and interstate relations.
Trade Review"Punishing the Prince provides both a compelling explanation for observed patterns of democratic cooperation and additional empirical content beyond previous explanations of the same phenomenon, including the effects of leadership change itself on patterns of cooperation. In other words, it provides valuable, and all too rare, predictions that can discriminate among competing explanations."--Scott Wolford, Perspectives on Politics "This is an important and impressive book, supporting and extending a theoretical view of politics that integrates the analysis of domestic and international processes in a manner that is necessary to the understanding of both."--James Lee Ray, International History Review "Punishing the Prince is an important study that will be influential in a number of key scholarly debates. The theory developed in this book offers a compelling perspective on the causes of change in interstate relations, the success of international cooperation, the causal mechanisms behind 'audience costs,' and the broad influence of domestic political institutions on international relations. I fully expect this book to become assigned reading in many core seminars on international relations and for the arguments developed herein to spawn significant further research."--Brett Ashley Leeds, Cambridge Journals
Table of ContentsList of Illustrations ix List of Tables xi Preface xiii Chapter 1: We Have No Quarrel with the People 1 Leader Specifi c Punishments and Interstate Relations 3 Proper Nouns in International Relations 12 International Cooperation 15 Chapter 2: A Theory of Leader Specifi c Punishments 31 A Stochastic Prisoners' Dilemma with Leader Mortality 33 A Continuous Choice Prisoners' Dilemma 50 Appendix 65 Chapter 3: Political Institutions, Policy Variability, and the Survival of Leaders 77 Leader Survival 77 Selectorate Politics 79 Selectorate Institutions, Policy Choice, and Leader Survival 80 Policy Variability and the Turnover of Leaders 83 Chapter 4: Leader Specifi c Strategies in Human Subject Experiments 89 Human Subject Experiments 90 Results 93 Conclusions 101 Chapter 5: International Trade, Institutions, and Leader Change 109 Data 111 Setup of Econometric Tests and Model Specifi cation 115 Results 119 Conclusions 140 Chapter 6: Putting the Sovereign Back into Sovereign Debt 142 Institutions, Credibility, and Explanations of Debt 143 Modeling the Debt Repayment 145 Data 154 Debt, Repayment, and Leader Replacement 157 Conclusions 172 Chapter 7: Confl ictual Interactions 173 International Crises 173 Economic Sanctions 182 Chapter 8: Positive Political Theory and Policy 190 Building Trust and Cooperation 190 Positive Political Theory or Policy Advice? 192 Conclusions 199 Bibliography 201 Index 217
