Description
Book SynopsisCan great powers ensure the political outcomes they want and prevent political developments they oppose, by stationing their military forces in distant regions during peacetime? If so, what kinds of military capabilities yield this sort of peacetime political leverage? And what kinds of political goals can-and, just as importantly, cannot-be achieved through forward military presence? In the post-9/11 world, as the United States seeks to use its unrivalled global military predominance to build a safer, better world by preventing terrorism and encouraging societies around the world to embrace democracy, these questions take on enormous importance. Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion addresses these issues by looking at British, French, and American experiences in the Middle East, South America, the Caribbean basin, and Africa over the last two centuries. The authors'' findings will have a significant impact on scholarship but, more importantly, on American decision-making communities. An essential volume for anyone working in the field of international relations whether it is policy making, diplomacy, military planning or the private sector.
Trade ReviewMilitary power is meant to achieve a political outcome. This book proposes the basic conditions necessary to answer the question: how can the presence of military force shape a peacetime political environment? Experts study six cases, and Professor Rhodes draws their conclusions together in a brilliant and most instructive set of propositions that carry profound implications for American policy-makers and will be of great value to all students of political and military affairs. -- George W. Baer, Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Maritime Strategy, U. S. Naval War College
In a study that could not be more timely, Edward Rhodes and his colleagues have examined little known but important historical cases to illuminate the ability — and the limits — of the major powers' military presence to shape regional politics. -- Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations, Columbia University
Careful case studies of Britain, France, and the U.S. indicate that power projection is an uncertain instrument. Success depends on coherent strategies, political presence, good intelligence, sensitivity to domestic constraints, and considerable prudence. If only those responsible for American policy in the Middle East had read and assimilated the lessons of this book! -- Richard Ned Lebow, James O. Freedman, Presidential Professor of Government, Dartmouth College
How can a great power affect political developments in a region? In this important historical study, Rhodes and his colleagues demonstrate that by maintaining a peacetime military presence in a region, a great power can shape that region's political evolution to serve its interests. This study yields valuable benchmarks for gauging the role that America's overseas military presence plays in today's world.... -- Robert J. Art, Brandeis University
How can a great power affect political developments in a region? In this important historical study, Rhodes and his colleagues demonstrate that by maintaining a peacetime military presence in a region, a great power can shape that region's political evolution to serve its interests. This study yields valuable benchmarks for gauging the role that America's overseas military presence plays in today's world. -- Robert J. Art, Brandeis University
Table of ContentsChapter 1 A Sword Half Withdrawn from the Scabbard: The Royal Navy and British "Shaping" of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant, 1816-1852 Chapter 2 Decline, Disengagement, and Shaping the Periphery: Great Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant, 1919-1937 Chapter 3 A Shadow Cast from Afar: The Royal Navy in South America, 1850-1900 Chapter 4 The U.S. Navy in the Caribbean, 1903-1920 Chapter 5 La Chasse Gardee: Post-World War II French West Africa, 1945-1970 Chapter 6 Toujours la Chasse Gardee? French Power and Influence in Late 20th Century Francophone Central Africa, 1970-1995 Chapter 7 Conclusions
