Description
Book SynopsisDrawing on the American political experience, this title reveals how variations in domestic party politics and international power have led presidents from George Washington to Barack Obama to pursue strategies that differ widely in international ambition and cost.
Trade ReviewOne of Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles for 2011: Top 25 Books "Trubowitz has written an impressive book with a modest thesis. He makes the case that both the distribution of power around the world and domestic politics influence strategic decisions in U.S. foreign policy... Trubowitz captures the complexity of these decisions with theoretical sophistication, an unusual breadth of historical examples, and an impressive clarity of argument. This is an important book."--Choice "Scholars of American politics and international relations alike will find a strong theoretical foundation along with extensive empirical material in this work for exploring such topics."--Meena Bose, Political Science Quarterly
Table of ContentsList of Tables and Figures xi Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Chapter One: Introduction 1 Statesmen, Partisans, and Geopolitics The Two Faces of Grand Strategy 2 Statesmen as Strategic Politicians 4 Grand Strategy Past and Present 7 Chapter Two: Grand Strategy's Microfoundations 9 Variations in Grand Strategy 9 A Model of Executive Choice 16 Determinants of Grand Strategy 31 Research Design and Outline 37 Chapter Three: Why States Appease Their Foes 44 The Appeasement Puzzle 44 George Washington and the Appeasement of Britain 46 Abraham Lincoln, Britain, and the Confederacy 55 Franklin Roosevelt, Hitler, and Appeasement, 1936-1939 64 Appeasement Reconsidered 74 Chapter Four: When States Expand 77 Theories of Expansionism 77 James Monroe, Republican Factionalism, and the Monroe Doctrine 79 William McKinley, Cuba, and the Threat of Domestic Populism 90 George W. Bush, September 11, and the Promise of Party Realignment 97 Expansionism: Necessity or Choice? 104 Chapter Five: Why States Underreach 106 Strategies of Restraint 107 Jacksonian Fissures and Martin Van Buren's Strategic Adjustment 108 Herbert Hoover, Republican Sectarianism, and Strategic Retrenchment 114 Bill Clinton, the Democrats, and Selective Engagement 120 The Paradox of Strategic "Underextension" 127 Chapter Six: Conclusion 129 Statecraft's Twin Engines American Balancing in Historical Perspective 130 Geopolitics and Partisan Politics: Managing Cross-Pressure 132 Secondary Powers and Nondemocracies 139 Barack Obama and Grand Strategy 145 References 151 Index 177
