Description
Book SynopsisThe Political Economy of Trade Policy: Theory, Evidence and Applications is a collection of sole-authored and co-authored papers by Devashish Mitra that have been published in various scholarly journals over the last two decades. It covers diverse topics in the political economy of trade policy, ranging from the role of modeling lobby formation in the context of trade policy determination to its applications to the question of unilateralism versus reciprocity and trade agreements. It also includes the theory and the empirics of the choice of policy instruments. Finally, the book presents the empirical investigation of the Grossman-Helpman “Protection for Sale” model as well as the Mayer “Median-Voter” model of trade policy determination.
Table of ContentsIntroduction; Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection; Endogenous Political Organization and the Value of Trade Agreements; Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy (co-authored with Pravin Krishna); Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting (co-authored with Pravin Krishna); Unilateralism in Trade Policy: A Survey of Alternative Political-Economy Approaches (co-authored with Pravin Krishna); Endogenous Trade Policy through Majority Voting: An Empirical Investigation (co-authored with Pushan Dutt); Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation (co-authored with Pushan Dutt); Labor versus Capital in Trade Policy: The Role of Ideology and Inequality (co-authored with Pushan Dutt); Can We Obtain Realistic Parameter Estimates for the "Protection for Sale Model"? (co-authored with Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet Ulubasoglu); "Protection for Sale" in a Developing Country: Democracy vs. Dictatorship (co-authored with Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet Ulubasoglu); On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion; Protection vs. Promotion: An Empirical Investigation (co-authored with Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet Ulubasoglu).
