Description

Book Synopsis
What are we? What owns our thoughts and experiences? Are we anything at all? After an introduction, Section 2 assesses a ''no-bearer'' theory of experience, and the ''no-self'' contention that self-representations are about no real entity, before introducing a positive hypothesis about the objects of our self-representations: the ''animalist'' claim that we are biological organisms. Section 3 discusses the classic challenge to animalism that brain transplantation is something we could survive but no animal could survive. This challenge introduces positive alternatives to animalism, as well as animalist responses, including one which questions the assumption that psychology is irrelevant to organism persistence. Section 4 surveys a ''thinking parts'' problem and conjoined twinning and commisurotomy, also considered problematic for animalism. The interpretation of these cases revisits questions about bearers of experience, objects of self-representation, and the relation of biology and psychology. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Personal Identity and the Self

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    A Paperback by Rory Madden

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      Publisher: Cambridge University Press
      Publication Date: Publication Date: 11/30/2024
      ISBN13: 9781009570510, 978-1009570510
      ISBN10: 100957051X
      Also in:
      Philosophy: metaphysics and ontology

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      What are we? What owns our thoughts and experiences? Are we anything at all? After an introduction, Section 2 assesses a ''no-bearer'' theory of experience, and the ''no-self'' contention that self-representations are about no real entity, before introducing a positive hypothesis about the objects of our self-representations: the ''animalist'' claim that we are biological organisms. Section 3 discusses the classic challenge to animalism that brain transplantation is something we could survive but no animal could survive. This challenge introduces positive alternatives to animalism, as well as animalist responses, including one which questions the assumption that psychology is irrelevant to organism persistence. Section 4 surveys a ''thinking parts'' problem and conjoined twinning and commisurotomy, also considered problematic for animalism. The interpretation of these cases revisits questions about bearers of experience, objects of self-representation, and the relation of biology and psychology. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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