Description

Book Synopsis
This study demonstrates that the full time party officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) used the term party leadership to both disguise and signal their efforts to lead the Communists who manned the Soviet state. In 1946, Stalin had made the newly formed Council of Ministers of the USSR, led by its Bureau (Presidium) directly responsible for planning and administering the Soviet economy. As a result, the full time officials clashed constantly and publicly over the relative importance of their direct intervention in production as opposed to ideological education and personnel management in their efforts to provide party leadership of the state from 1946 until 1964. Zhdanov and Malenkov clashed over the issue until Zhdanov's death in 1948 and Malenkov clashed with Khrushchev over the same issue from 1949 until Stalin's death in 1953. This conflict became more explicit once Malenkov was named Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Khrushchev first secretary of the C

Trade Review

This is a substantial contribution to our understanding of the evolution of the Soviet regime from a leading expert in postwar Soviet politics. Jonathan Harris explains how the regime failed to establish a clear and stable relationship between the structures of the party and state, to agree to a balance between the application of Marxist-Leninist theory and pragmatic economic management, and to decide between centralizing and decentralizing decision-making. The painstaking research, voluminous detail, and measured analysis make this a must-read for those who want to understand the challenges of sustaining revolutionary dynamism and economic efficiency in the centrally planned economy of the Soviet Union, and why the leadership failed to rise to them.

-- James Harris, University of Leeds

Table of Contents
Introduction: The Origins of Conflict
Chapter 1: Khrushchev vs. Malenkov, 1948–1953
Chapter 2: Chairman Malenkov vs First Secretary Khrushchev
Chapter 3: The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU: Khrushchev Defines his Priorities, 1956–1957
Chapter 4: Khrushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1958
Chapter 5: The Impact of the U-2 Crisis: The 22nd Congress of the CPSU
Chapter 6: Conflicts over Ideology and the Shrinkage and the Reform of the Apparat: The Return to Central State Control, 1961–1963
Chapter 7: The CC/CPSU Plenum on Ideological Work (June 1963) during Khrushchev's Last Year

Party Leadership under Stalin and Khrushchev

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    A Paperback by Jonathan Harris

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      View other formats and editions of Party Leadership under Stalin and Khrushchev by Jonathan Harris

      Publisher: Lexington Books
      Publication Date: 1/15/2021 12:07:00 AM
      ISBN13: 9781498528405, 978-1498528405
      ISBN10: 1498528406

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      This study demonstrates that the full time party officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) used the term party leadership to both disguise and signal their efforts to lead the Communists who manned the Soviet state. In 1946, Stalin had made the newly formed Council of Ministers of the USSR, led by its Bureau (Presidium) directly responsible for planning and administering the Soviet economy. As a result, the full time officials clashed constantly and publicly over the relative importance of their direct intervention in production as opposed to ideological education and personnel management in their efforts to provide party leadership of the state from 1946 until 1964. Zhdanov and Malenkov clashed over the issue until Zhdanov's death in 1948 and Malenkov clashed with Khrushchev over the same issue from 1949 until Stalin's death in 1953. This conflict became more explicit once Malenkov was named Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Khrushchev first secretary of the C

      Trade Review

      This is a substantial contribution to our understanding of the evolution of the Soviet regime from a leading expert in postwar Soviet politics. Jonathan Harris explains how the regime failed to establish a clear and stable relationship between the structures of the party and state, to agree to a balance between the application of Marxist-Leninist theory and pragmatic economic management, and to decide between centralizing and decentralizing decision-making. The painstaking research, voluminous detail, and measured analysis make this a must-read for those who want to understand the challenges of sustaining revolutionary dynamism and economic efficiency in the centrally planned economy of the Soviet Union, and why the leadership failed to rise to them.

      -- James Harris, University of Leeds

      Table of Contents
      Introduction: The Origins of Conflict
      Chapter 1: Khrushchev vs. Malenkov, 1948–1953
      Chapter 2: Chairman Malenkov vs First Secretary Khrushchev
      Chapter 3: The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU: Khrushchev Defines his Priorities, 1956–1957
      Chapter 4: Khrushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1958
      Chapter 5: The Impact of the U-2 Crisis: The 22nd Congress of the CPSU
      Chapter 6: Conflicts over Ideology and the Shrinkage and the Reform of the Apparat: The Return to Central State Control, 1961–1963
      Chapter 7: The CC/CPSU Plenum on Ideological Work (June 1963) during Khrushchev's Last Year

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