Description
Book SynopsisThis book assesses the larger influences that government termination by parliaments has on executivelegislative relations, claiming that the way in which the governments may be challenged or dismissed has far greater impact than previously understood.
The core feature of a parliamentary system is not that governments tend to emerge from the legislatures in some way or another, but their political responsibility to this body. While in only some parliamentary systems the government needs formal support of parliament to take office, in all parliamentary systems no government can survive against the will of parliament. The academic literature related to the rules for how governments form is vast. Strikingly, scholars have paid far less time to unpack the core institution of parliamentary systems of government the confidence relationship and the various no confidence procedures. The chapters explore the institutions by which parliaments hold governments accountable a
Table of Contents
1. Parliaments and government termination: understanding the confidence relationship 2. Constitutional parliamentarism in Europe, 1800–2019 3. The vote of no confidence: towards a framework for analysis 4. Prime ministers, the vote of confidence and the management of coalition terminations between elections 5. Termination of parliamentary governments: revised definitions and implications 6. The effect of the constructive vote of no-confidence on government termination and government durability 7. Government termination in Europe: a sensitivity analysis 8. Party-system polarisation, legislative institutions and cabinet survival in 28 parliamentary democracies, 1945–2019 9. Government termination and anti-defection laws in parliamentary democracies 10. Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies
