Description
Book SynopsisSinno closely examines the fortunes of the various factions in Afghanistan that have been fighting each other and foreign armies since the 1979 Soviet invasion, offering a new understanding of how their organizational structure determine success.
Trade ReviewSinno does a remarkably thorough job of analyzing the Afghan insurgency and tribal interactions from 1978 through the present. This section is insightful, thoughtful, and exceptionally valuable; he reveals a deep knowledge of Afghan politics and rivalries, personalities, and agendas. Sinno's organizational theory approach to explaining success and failure of rival groups during this period is persuasive. His tables and analysis are clear and direct and provide an excellent starting point for anyone wanting to understand the complexities of events in Afghanistan from the end of the Soviet occupation through the collapse of the Najib regime and the rise of the Taliban. It is doubtful that there is an analysis of events in Afghanistan that is better, more complete, and more useful to a military commander, diplomat, or Provincial Reconstruction Team chief than what can be found in chapters six through eight of this book. This analysis should open some eyes and minds to reassessing the purpose and direction of the current operational activities in Afghanistan.
-- Keith D. Dickson * Joint Forces Quarterly *
Sinno has produced an insightful book. His emphasis on organizational theory will arm those who study conflict with a valuable perspective.
-- H. R. McMaster * Survival *
Sinno knows a lot about Afghanistan and offers significant insights about organizations and strategy on which others will want to build.
-- Lawrence D. Freedman * Foreign Affairs *
Sinno's finding should end the current search of U.S. policymakers for a 'moderate Taliban' that can be broken off from the insurgency.... For the Taliban remains a formidable organization, and his book is a formidable account of why.
-- Barnett Rubin * Perspectives on Politics *
The book accomplishes a crucial social science goal: it develops a parsimonious and generalizable theory that explains a wide range of behavior, without the need to resort to other variables (such as religion, ethnicity, ideology, or unique factors of anthropology or history). Sinno concludes with a set of predictions about other cases, using his findings to provide useful advice for policymakers. While he only mentions in passing the relevance of his findings for the Middle East, it is striking how well his arguments seem to explain ongoing conflicts everywhere from the Palestinian territories to Iraq. For all of these reasons, this book has great value.
-- Kimberly Marten * Political Science Quarterly *
This book is a fascinating and serious piece of scholarship that carries implicit policy warnings.... Highly recommended.
* Choice *
Table of Contents1. Organizing to WinPart One: An Organizational Theory of Group Conflict
2. Organization and the Outcome of Conflicts
3. Advantages and Limitations of Structures
4. The Gist of the Organizational TheoryPart Two: Explaining the Outcomes of Afghan Conflicts
5. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
6. Resilience through Division, 1979–1989
7. The Cost of the Failure to Restructure, 1989–1994
8. The Rise of the Taliban, 1994–2001
9. Afghan Conflicts under U.S. Occupation, 2001–Part Three: And Beyond...
10. The Organizational Theory beyond AfghanistanGlossary of Terms
Participants in Post-1978 Afghan Conflicts
References
Index
