Description
Book SynopsisIn On Truth and the Representation of Reality, Dan Nesher develops a new theory of truth in the framework of pragmatist theory of representation. Using the pragmatist theory of perception for the basis of his epistemological explanation of our confrontation with external Reality and how it''s represented, Nesher shows that in our perceptual operations we quasi-prove the truth of our perceptual judgments. He explains how- through our proving the truth of our propositions and theories, we know that they correspond to Reality, and through our proving their falsity, we know that they don''t correspond to it.
Table of ContentsChapter 1 Foreword Chapter 2 Introduction Chapter 3 Spinoza's Theory of Truth Chapter 4 Peircean Realism: Truth as Meaning of Cognitive Signs Representing External Reality Chapter 5 Pragmatist Realism: The Third Philosophical Perspective as the "Intermediate Point" between "Metaphysical Realism" and "Internal Realism" Chapter 6 "Which Side Spinoza Would Have Taken [between Einstein and Bohr] if He had Lived to See the [Scientific] Development of Our Days" (Bohr, 1949:237): An Analysis of Human Representation of Physical Reality Chapter 7 The Pragmatist Conception of Truth with a "Bold" Solution to the Liar Paradox Chapter 8 In Spite of Davidson's Arguments for "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth," Truth Can be Defined Chapter 9 We Know What Our Propositions Represent When We Prove Their Truth: Response to Gettier Chapter 10 Putnam on Truth: Can We Know Reality with a Big "R" with Proved Truths with a Small "t?" Chapter 11 Pragmatic Theory of Truth: Are Frege's and Ramsey's Equation "p is true = p" and Tarski's Equivalence "X is true if, and only if, p" True? Chapter 12 The Pragmatist Conceptions of "Fact," "True Proposition," "Truth Conditions," and "True to the Facts:" Our Knowledge of External Reality Chapter 13 Bibliography Chapter 14 Index
