Description
Book SynopsisUnder the Labour government of 1974 to 1979, the approach of the British state to the Northern Ireland conflict underwent a significant change. Key ministers and civil servants began to accept that a constitutional solution was unachievable in the short term and that violence would continue for many years.
With No solution, S. C. Aveyard sheds new light on this difficult period. Using a wide range of archival correspondence and diaries, he reconstructs private discussions and policy formulation under Labour. He considers the collapse of power-sharing in May 1974, the secret dialogue with the Provisional IRA during the 1975 ceasefire and the acquiescence of Labour ministers in continuing indefinite direct rule from Westminster. A major shift in security policy, frequently misunderstood as ‘Ulsterisation’, is examined alongside republican responses and the Provisional IRA’s adoption of a ‘long war’ strategy. Attention is als
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. Background: British Labour and Northern Ireland 1964-74
2. The collapse of power-sharing
3. Drift?
4. Negotiating the Provisional IRA ceasefire
5. Fraying at the edges: the Provisional IRA ceasefire
6. After the ceasefire
7. Police primacy and the myth of Ulsterisation
8. 'Positive direct rule': economic policy
9. Political inertia
10. The evolution of the long war
Conclusion
Index
