Description
Book SynopsisElizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person” have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe’s theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reconciles seemingly incompatible points of view.
Trade ReviewTimely and significant…[A] meticulous examination of Anscombe’s work. -- Constantine Sandis * Times Literary Supplement *
No Morality, No Self: Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism is an absolutely remarkable achievement. James Doyle shows that, when properly understood, Elizabeth Anscombe presents a major challenge to contemporary moral philosophy. This book will bring Anscombe’s thought to the forefront of ethical theory. -- Sergio Tenenbaum, University of Toronto
James Doyle brings out how radical and philosophically significant are Elizabeth Anscombe’s ideas, in his discussions of two of Anscombe’s best-known theses: that the term ‘moral’ as it occurs in such contexts as ‘moral obligation’ is a word of merely mesmeric force, and that ‘I’ is not an expression that refers to something. Critics of these two theses must now think carefully and take stock in light of Doyle’s arguments. This book is a major contribution to Anscombe studies. -- Roger Teichmann, University of Oxford
