Description
Book SynopsisMuch recent work on concepts has been inspired by and developed within the bounds of the representational theory of the mind often taken for granted by philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, and psychologists alike. The contributions to this volume take a more encompassing perspective on the issue of concepts. Rather than modelling details of our representational architecture in line with the dominant paradigm, they explore three traditional issues concerning concepts. Is mastery of a language necessary for thought? Do concepts reduce to abilities? Is the analysis of concepts a viable means to ascertain truths from the proverbial armchair? An introductory essay provides a rough geography of key ideas and issues shaping the overall debate on concepts within contemporary philosophy.
Table of ContentsAcknowledgments Christian Nimtz and Julia Langkau: Concepts in Philosophy—A Rough Geography Robert Brandom: Conceptual Content and Discursive Practice José Luis Bermúdez: Two Arguments for the Language-Dependence of Thought Martine Nida-Rümelin: Thinking without Language. A Phenomenological Argument for its Possibility and Existence Hannes Rakoczy: From Thought to Language to Thought: Towards a Dialectical Picture of the Development of Thinking and Speaking Anthony Kenny: Concepts, Brains, and Behaviour Hans-Johann Glock: Concepts, Abilities, and Propositions Sebastian Rödl: The Self-Conscious Power of Sensory Knowledge Katia Saporiti: In Search of Concepts Frank Jackson: Conceptual Analysis for Representationalists Christian Nimtz: Philosophical Thought Experiments as Exercises in Conceptual Analysis Finn Spicer: Kripke and the Neo-Descriptivist Mark Textor: Frege on Conceptual and Propositional Analysis
