Description
Book SynopsisMoral Judgment: Contemporary French, German and AngloAmerican Perspectives offers a novel account of the nature and justification of moral judgments by integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject. In the author’s view, moral judgments are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. In other words, it is by identifying the obligations tied to the multiple dimensions of our identities ( for example, friend, teacher, romantic partner, citizen) that we can ultimately understand how we ought to act. As both Aristotle and Kant recognized, however, doing so requires the acquisition of moral virtues which allow us to better discern practical reasons in concrete situations.
This book is the first to relate analytic reflections on moral judgment to philosophical contributions on this topic stemming from both France and Germany, many of which remain untranslated.
Table of ContentsIntroduction: What is moral judgment? / Part I: The Aristotelian Critique of Kantian Judgment: Perspectives from France, Germany and the Anglo-American World / 1. Practical Reasoning without Virtue? Moral Judgment in the Aristotelian Communitarian Tradition / 2. German Neo-Aristotelianism and the Normativity of Ethos / 3. French Aristotelianism and the Concept of Deliberation / Part II Rationality, Identity and Virtue: Kantian Judgment After the Aristotelian Critique / 4. Discourse Ethics and the Basis of Moral Judgments / 5. Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities / 6. Judging without Principles: Arendt’s Model of Practical Judgment / 7. Kantian Deliberation and Conflicting Obligations / 8. Learning Judgment: Pedagogy, Virtue and Discerning Reasons / Conclusion
