Description
Book SynopsisJonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. In Part I (History), he explores the historical context of the debate, and discusses the moral error theories of David Hume and of some more or less influential twentieth century philosophers, including Axel Hägerström, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richard Robinson. He argues that the early cases for moral error theory are suggestive but that they would have been stronger had they included something like J. L. Mackie''s arguments that moral properties and facts are metaphysically queer. Part II (Critique) focuses on these arguments. Olson identifies four queerness arguments, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity, and goes on to establish that while the first three are not compelling, the fourth has considerable force, especially when combined with debunking explanations of why we tend to believe that
Trade ReviewFor the most part, Olson is a lucid writer and it is refreshing to see a philosopher write candidly about the limitations of even his own arguments... the book will likely generate fruitful discussion for years to come. In particular, metaethicists will want to consider Olson's case for moral error theory in chs 5 through 9. Hume scholars might want to consider ch. 2, and those interested in metaepistemology may benefit from reading ch. 8. * Jeff Wisdom, Philosophical Quarterly *
Olson's Moral Error Theory offers a historically informed and theoretically subtle discussion of moral error theory in response to the much greater attention this view has received in the last decade. * Hallvard Lillehammer. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism *
Table of ContentsPART I: HISTORY; PART II: CRITIQUE; PART III: DEFENCE
