Description
Book SynopsisThe book explores the evolution, through the first half of the 20th century, of the key neoclassical concept of rationality. The analysis begins with the development of modern decision theory, covers the interwar debates over the role of perfect foresight and analyses the first game-theoretic solution concepts of von Neumann and Nash.
The author's proposition is that the notion of rationality suffered a profound transformation that reduced it to a formal property of consistency. Such a transformation paralleled that of neoclassical economics as a whole from a discipline dealing with real economic processes to one investigating issues of logical consistency between mathematical relationships.
Modeling Rational Agents will be of great interest to scholars of the history of economic thought and method, as well as all those working in the field of game and decision theory.
Trade Review'The fame of Modeling Rational Agents precedes it. Nicola Giocoli's book won the Best Monograph prize, 2004, from the European Society for the History of Economic Thought. . . It does not disappoint the expectations thus aroused. Giocoli's account is powerful and fascinating, and elegantly presented.' -- Andy Denis, Economics and Philosophy
'The History of Economics Society has honored this study with the Joseph Dorfman Award. Reading this insightful and thought-provoking book produces ample proof that both the donor and the recipient should be congratulated for this choice.' -- Hansjorg Klausinger, History of Economic Ideas
'. . . highly recommended to all those interested in the evolution of scientific ideas in the 20th century.' -- Solomon Marcus, Mathematical Reviews
'Giocoli's book is an impressive tour de force that relies on extensive and expansive literatures. It should be required reading for anyone desiring a new perspective on the history of economics in the previous century.' -- Esther-Mirjam Sent, EH.Net
Table of ContentsContents: 1. Introduction: Two Images of Economics 2. The Escape from Psychology 3. The Escape from Perfect Foresight 4. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Game Theory 5. Nash’s Game Theory 6. Conclusion: The Fall and Rise of Modern Game Theory References Index
