Description
Book SynopsisThis book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Table of ContentsLimits, Continuity, and Robustness: Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Finite Player Approximations to a Continuum of Players (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (D Fudenberg et al.); Reputation Effects: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Single Long-Run Player (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent (M Celentani et al.); When is Reputation Bad? (J Ely et al.); Repeated Games: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (D Fudenberg & E Maskin); Perfect Public Equilibria When Players are Patient (D Fudenberg et al.); Continuous-Time Limits of Discrete-Time Games (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); and other papers.
