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Book Synopsis
Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a unique system of partnerships and alliances, known as the US world order. Within this order, it has sought both compliance from, and consensus with, its partners. Sometimes it has achieved both, sometimes one but not the other, and sometimes neither. What accounts for this variation in hegemonic leadership? Giacomo Chiozza suggests that the answer depends on the domestic political institutions that structure US relations with the incumbent leaders in the partner nations. Domestic political institutions that foster political successors and allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover make it easier for the US to sustain friendly relations. However, unexpectedly, institutions that allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover also create domestic political incentives that foster the attainment of better governance and more respect of human rights.

Leverage and Cooperation in the US World Order

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    A Paperback by Giacomo Chiozza

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      Publisher: Cambridge University Press
      Publication Date: Publication Date: 3/6/2025
      ISBN13: 9781009355094, 978-1009355094
      ISBN10: 1009355090
      Also in:
      International relations

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a unique system of partnerships and alliances, known as the US world order. Within this order, it has sought both compliance from, and consensus with, its partners. Sometimes it has achieved both, sometimes one but not the other, and sometimes neither. What accounts for this variation in hegemonic leadership? Giacomo Chiozza suggests that the answer depends on the domestic political institutions that structure US relations with the incumbent leaders in the partner nations. Domestic political institutions that foster political successors and allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover make it easier for the US to sustain friendly relations. However, unexpectedly, institutions that allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover also create domestic political incentives that foster the attainment of better governance and more respect of human rights.

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