Description
Book SynopsisWhy do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? This title looks at one famous case - the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Using detailed evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, it examines the incentives and returns of lenders.
Trade Review"A thoroughly enjoyable economic history book with great relevance for the present debate on sovereign borrowing."--Diane Coyle, Enlightened Economist "Lending to the Borrower from Hell is a wonderful example of what becomes possible when one takes economic theory on a trip to the archive and actually reads the small print of each contract. It provides for the first time an economically sound explanation for Spain's ability to borrow in the sixteenth century that actually fits the facts. That is an outstanding achievement."--Regina Grafe, EH.Net "[T]his innovative monograph substantially enriches our understanding of Castile's government borrowing, as well as the nature of sovereign default in early modern Europe. And it will most certainly conquer a central place in the literature and future debates on public debt and finance from a historical perspective."--Benoit Marechaux, CritCom "Intensely researched."--Elvira Vilches, Renaissance Quarterly
Table of ContentsACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix PROLOGUE 1 CHAPTER 1 Lending to the Sound of Cannon 9 CHAPTER 2 Philip's Empire 45 CHAPTER 3 Taxes, Debts, and Institutions 74 CHAPTER 4 The Sustainable Debts of Philip II 105 CHAPTER 5 Lending to the Borrower from Hell 132 CHAPTER 6 Serial Defaults, Serial Profits 173 CHAPTER 7 Risk Sharing with the Monarch 211 CHAPTER 8 Tax, Empire, and the Logic of Spanish Decline 243 EPILOGUE Financial Folly and Spain's Black Legend 271 REFERENCES 281 INDEX 297
