Description
Book SynopsisTestimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hearer. In this book, Jennifer Lackey shows that this thesis is false and, hence, that the literature on testimony has been shaped at its core by a view that is fundamentally misguided. She then defends a detailed alternative to this conception of testimony: whereas the views currently dominant focus on the epistemic status of what speakers believe, Lackey advances a theory that instead centers on what speakers say. The upshot is that, strictly speaking, we do not learn from one another''s beliefs - we learn from one another''s words. Once this shi
Trade Review...presents a sustained, and engaging, argument for a distinctive epistemological position... admirably clear and densely argued, Epistemology needed a new look at testimony and Learning from Words gives it one. * Paul Faulkner, Mind *
an informative read. The theory she advocates deserves recognition as an important contribution to the discourse on testimony. An attempt to move past emphasizing speakers at the expense of hearers, or hearers at the expense of speakers, is long overdue, and Lackey is clear and concise in drawing out the obligations placed on each. * David R. T. Fraser, Philosophy Now *
Table of ContentsIntroduction ; 1. The Nature of Testimony ; 2. Rejecting Transmission ; 3. A Defense of Learning from Words ; 4. Norms of Assertion and Testimonial Knowledge ; 5. A Critique of Reductionism and Non-Reductionism ; 6. Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony ; 7. Positive Reasons, Defeaters, and the Infant/Child Objection ; 8. Trust and Assurance: The Interpersonal View of Testimony ; Appendix. Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source
