Description
Book SynopsisApplying a novel theoretical approach, Tamar Groswald Ozery combines law and political economy to deconstruct the role of law in China's market development since 1978. With a vast range of primary sources, Ozery examines the complex, entwined relationships between law, politics and economics to explain corporate development and governance in China.
Trade Review'What is the role of law in the dramatic development of Chinese firms and Chinese capital markets in the last decades? Tamar Groswald Ozery explores this critical question by skillfully examining numerous corporate law reforms in China in view of its unique political context. The result is a remarkable book that offers a goldmine of information on Chinese corporate governance, a fascinating account of the different functions of corporate law in China's autocratic party-state system, and new lenses for understanding the relationship between law and development.' Mariana Pargendler, Professor of Law at Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School in São Paulo
'Groswald Ozery's focus on political power dynamics in China's legal system offers fresh insights into how law has simultaneously enhanced the state's capacity as a market regulator and, crucially, elevated the Party's direct agency in the market. Law and Political Economy in Corporate China is an important contribution to our understanding of China's capital market development.' Curtis J. Milhaupt,, William F. Baxter – Visa International Professor of Law, Stanford Law School
Table of ContentsIntroduction; Part I. Economic Development and the Role of Law: 1.1 The Traditional Framework; 1.2 Law and Political Economy: A New Paradigm; Part II. China's Development Trajectory and the Role of Law: 2.1 Early Reform Era (December 1978–1991); 2.2 Legal Modernization Era (1992–2009); 2.3 Legalized Politicization Era (From 2010 to Present); Part III. Law and Political Economy in Corporate China: 3.1 Corporate Governance under Market Experimentation; 3.2 Corporate Governance under State Capitalism; 3.3 Legally Politicized Corporate Governance; 3.4 Legally Politicized Corporate Governance as a Functional Alternative; Conclusions; Appendix: Methodology and Data Selection; Index.
