Description
Book SynopsisThis volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program — now called epistemic game theory — extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior.
Table of ContentsAn Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games; Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge; Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria; Intrinsic Correlation in Games; Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium; Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty; Admissibility in Games; Self-Admissible Sets.
