Description
Book SynopsisIn essays that illuminate not only the recent past but shortcomings in today's intelligence assessments, sixteen experts show how prospective antagonists appraised each other prior to the World Wars. This cautionary tale, warns that intelligence agencies can do certain things very well--but other things poorly, if at all. Originally published in 1
Table of Contents*FrontMatter, pg. i*CONTENTS, pg. v*LIST OF MAPS AND CHART, pg. vii*ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, pg. ix*ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES, pg. xi*INTRODUCTION, pg. 1*1. Cabinet, Tsar, Kaiser: Three Approaches to Assessment, pg. 11*2. Austria-Hungary, pg. 37*3. Imperial Germany, pg. 62*4. The Russian Empire, pg. 98*5. France and the German Menace, pg. 127*6. French Estimates of Germany's Operational War Plans, pg. 150*7. Great Britain before 1914, pg. 172*8. Italy before 1915: The Quandary of the Vulnerable, pg. 205*9. British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe, pg. 237*10. French Military Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1938- 1939, pg. 271*11. National Socialist Germany: The Politics of Information, pg. 310*12. Fascist Italy Assesses Its Enemies, 1935-1940, pg. 347*13. Threat Identification and Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet Union, 1930-1941, pg. 375*14. Japanese Intelligence before the Second World War: "Best Case" Analysis, pg. 424*15. Great Britain's Assessment of Japan before the Outbreak of the Pacific War, pg. 456*16. United States Views of Germany and Japan in 1941, pg. 476*Conclusions: Capabilities and Proclivities, pg. 503*CONTRIBUTORS, pg. 543*INDEX, pg. 547
