Description
Book SynopsisThroughout the decade that predated the 1967 war, Jordan's declared views regarding Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict were not basically different from those of the Arab consensus. Namely, rejection of Israel's legitimacy. In the wake of the war King Hussein was the first Arab leader to realise that in order to regain the recently lost territories, which he considered a most vital and urgent task, he (and the other heads of state) would have to offer Israel a meaningful quid pro quo. Hence the shift in Jordan's policy was twofold: (1) A change of the traditional statements that had been made by the King and his officials prior to June 1967; and (2) a change in the views expressed by Jordanian spokespersons vis-a-vis the declarations of other Arab leaders.
Trade Review"This is an immensely erudite book which makes an original and important contribution to the literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and King Hussein's role in this intricate issue in particular. I personally attribute great importance to what Arab leaders publicly say and declare, especially their speeches pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In line with Dr Nevo's findings, my own research indicates that there was an overlap between King Hussein's declarations on the conflict in close Arab forums and his overt ones. Professor Nevo gives a comprehensive and penetrating account of Hussein's efforts to resolve this conflict. 'King Hussein and Jordans Perception of a Political Settlement with Israel, 1967-1988' is exceptionally well researched, and displays complete mastery of its sources. The book is an invaluable contribution and essential reading for students and researchers in the field." -- Moshe Shemesh is Head of the Unit for Research and Documentation of the Relations of Israel with the Arab World since 1949.
Table of ContentsIntroduction; Part I - The Historical Background; Part II: Jordanian Territorial and Conceptual Demands on Israel; Part III: Jordan's Options and its Quid Pro Quo; Conclusion.
