Description

Book Synopsis

In the present-day debate on free will, Kant's theory of freedom has been dismissed as bad metaphysics. This however leaves decisive questions partially unanswered, namely 1. To what concept of freedom does Kant lay claim? 2. What functions are ascribed to it? 3. What proof does Kant advance to justify it? The author demonstrates that Kant's theory has not been adequately represented in all three points, and resumes the negotiation about its systematic validity. Bojanowski demonstrates why the practice of morality cannot dispense with Kant's concept of autonomy as absolute freedom, and on the basis of Kant's epistemic critique he defends this concept against a deterministic moral scepticism. In conclusion, he demonstrates why this concept does not fail when faced with the possibility of morally evil acts, but that in fact talking about morally evil acts is not possible without it.

Kants Theorie der Freiheit: Rekonstruktion und Rehabilitierung

    Product form

    £107.95

    Includes FREE delivery

    RRP £127.00 – you save £19.05 (15%)

    Order before 4pm today for delivery by Sat 8 Aug 2026.

    A Hardback by Jochen Bojanowski

    1 in stock

      Trusted by thousands of customers. See 2,385+ Customer Reviews

      View other formats and editions of Kants Theorie der Freiheit: Rekonstruktion und Rehabilitierung by Jochen Bojanowski

      Publisher: De Gruyter
      Publication Date: Publication Date: 20/06/2006
      ISBN13: 9783110189445, 978-3110189445
      ISBN10:

      Description

      Book Synopsis

      In the present-day debate on free will, Kant's theory of freedom has been dismissed as bad metaphysics. This however leaves decisive questions partially unanswered, namely 1. To what concept of freedom does Kant lay claim? 2. What functions are ascribed to it? 3. What proof does Kant advance to justify it? The author demonstrates that Kant's theory has not been adequately represented in all three points, and resumes the negotiation about its systematic validity. Bojanowski demonstrates why the practice of morality cannot dispense with Kant's concept of autonomy as absolute freedom, and on the basis of Kant's epistemic critique he defends this concept against a deterministic moral scepticism. In conclusion, he demonstrates why this concept does not fail when faced with the possibility of morally evil acts, but that in fact talking about morally evil acts is not possible without it.

      Recently viewed products

      © 2026 Book Curl

        • American Express
        • Apple Pay
        • Diners Club
        • Discover
        • Google Pay
        • Maestro
        • Mastercard
        • PayPal
        • Shop Pay
        • Union Pay
        • Visa

        Login

        Forgot your password?

        Don't have an account yet?
        Create account