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Book SynopsisThroughout his corpus, Kant repeatedly and resolutely denies that there is a duty to promote one's own happiness, and most present-day Kantians seem to agree with him. In Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness, Samuel Kahn argues that this denial rests on two main ideas: (1) a conception of duty that makes the principle of ought implies can (OIC) and the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) analytic, and (2) the claim that humans necessarily promote their own happiness. This book defends OIC and PAP but nonetheless attacks the second idea, and it supplements this attack with two additional argumentsan interpersonal one and an intrapersonal onefor the claim that a modern day Kantian ethics should affirm a duty to promote one's own happiness.
Trade ReviewSamuel Kahn’s book is a wide-ranging and provocative discussion of important issues in normative ethics, metaethics and moral psychology. It contains thoughtful and cogent discussions not only of Kant and the Kant literature, but also of contemporary treatments of the moral ought, responsibility and the place of happiness among human ends. Kahn provides an engaging introduction to all these themes. -- Allen Wood, Indiana University Bloomington
Samuel Kahn explores one of the most puzzling but under-theorized aspects of Kant’s ethics: the nature and moral importance of human happiness. Against most readings, Kahn contends that not only was Kant wrong to insist that a person could have no moral duty to promote her own happiness, but also that his own views entail that we do. Kahn brings Kant’s ethics into a sustained and illuminating conversation with the extensive contemporary literature on the relationship between obligation, blameworthiness, and the possibility of fulfilling (or failing to fulfill) the demands of morality. This encyclopedic work will be a valuable resource not just for those interested in Kant’s practical philosophy, but for anyone concerned with the moral significance of our physical and psychological limitations. -- David Sussman, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Table of ContentsIntroduction Part One. Ought implies can in Kantian ethics Chapter 1. Terminology and Exegesis Section 1. Terminology Section 2. Exegesis Chapter 2. Arguments in Favor of OIC Section 1. Kant’s argument for OIC Section 2. The argument from explanation Section 3. The fairness argument Section 4. The prescriptivist argument Section 5. The argument from deontic logic Chapter 3. Objections to OIC Section 1. The appeal to alternate traditions Section 2. The epistemic argument Section 3. The ordinary language objection Section 4. The appeal to culpable inability Section 5. The argument from past obligations Section 6. The argument from simplicity Section 7. The argument from excuses Section 8. The appeal to Hume’s principle Section 9. The argument from reasons Section 10. The moral satisfaction objection Section 11. The appeal to obligations from nowhere Section 12. The argument from interdependence Section 13. The argument from epistemic oughts Section 14. The argument from feeling oughts Section 15. The appeal to conflicts of duties Section 16. The argument from emphasis Section 17. The appeal to conversational implicature Section 18. The exphi objection Part Two. The principle of alternate possibilities Chapter 4. Setting the stage Section 1. Frankfurt’s seminal attack Section 2. Conceding PAP but mitigating the consequences Chapter 5. The connection between PAP and OIC Section 1. OIC entails PAP with respect to blame Section 2. Blame requires impermissibility Section 3. Able not to and able to do otherwise Section 4. Some concluding remarks Chapter 6. The second line of defense Section 1. The metaphysical premise Subsection 1. Flickers and alchemy Subsection 2. The dilemma defense Subsection 3. The deterministic horn Subsection 4. The new dispositionalists Subsection 5. Morally relevant alternatives Section 2. The moral premise Subsection 1. PAP and OIC Subsection 2. The W-defense Subsection 3. Counterfactual interveners and knowledge Subsection 4. The reliability of intuitions Part Three. The duty to promote one’s own happiness in Kantian ethics Chapter 7. “Happiness,” “general duties” and the standard account Section 1. “Happiness” Section 2. “General duties” Section 3. The standard account Chapter 8. The means to happiness, indirect duties and two arguments for a direct duty Section 1. Indirect duties Section 2. Two arguments for a direct duty Chapter 9. Objections Section 1. Internal incoherence Section 2. The universal desire for happiness Section 3. Happiness as a necessary end Section 4. A duty to promote one’s own happiness would be otiose Section 5. Happiness is impossible Notes Bibliography
