Description
Book SynopsisThis groundbreaking series brings together a critical selection of key papers by the Nobel Memorial Laureates in Economics that have helped shape the development and present state of economics. The editors have organised this comprehensive series by theme and each volume focuses on those Laureates working in the same broad area of study. The careful selection of papers within each volume is set in context by an insightful introduction to the Laureates' careers and main published works. This landmark series will be an essential reference for scholars throughout the world.
Trade Review‘What a brilliant idea! To provide readers with both information on the Nobel Laureates in Economics and, to the degree possible, the original papers for which they were honored. The names of the “contributing” Laureates speak for themselves. Howard Vane and Chris Mulhearn, the editors, and Edward Elgar, the publisher, are to be congratulated for putting the idea into effect.’Table of ContentsContents: Acknowledgements General Introduction PART I JOHN C. HARSANYI Introduction to Part I Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn 1. John C. Harsanyi (1967), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By “Bayesian” Players, I-III. Part I. The Basic Model’ 2. John C. Harsanyi (1968a), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By “Bayesian” Players, Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points’ 3. John C. Harsanyi (1968b), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game’ PART II JOHN F. NASH Jr. Introduction to Part II Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn 4. John F. Nash Jr. (1950a), ‘Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games’ 5. John F. Nash Jr. (1950b), ‘The Bargaining Problem’ 6. John Nash (1951), ‘Non-Cooperative Games’ 7. John Nash (1953), ‘Two-Person Cooperative Games’ PART III REINHARD SELTEN Introduction to Part III Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn 8. Reinhard Selten (1975), ‘Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games’ 9. Reinhard Selten (1983), ‘A Model of Oligopolistic Size, Structure and Profitability’ 10. Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein (1984), ‘Gaps in Harley’s Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of “Tit for Tat”’ 11. Reinhard Selten (1990), ‘Bounded Rationality’ 12. Reinhard Selten, Michael Mitzkewitz and Gerald R. Uhlich (1997), ‘Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players’ PART IV ROBERT J. AUMANN Introduction to Part IV Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn 13. Robert J. Aumann (1959), ‘Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games’ 14. Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler ([1966], 1995), ‘Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament’ 15. Robert J. Aumann (1974), ‘Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies’ 16. Robert J. Aumann (1976), ‘Agreeing to Disagree’ 17. Robert J. Aumann and Lloyd L. Shapley (1976), ‘Long-Term Competition: A Game Theoretic Analysis’ 18. Robert J. Aumann (1987), ‘Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality’ PART V THOMAS C. SCHELLING Introduction to Part V Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn 19. Thomas C. Schelling (1956), ‘An Essay on Bargaining’ 20. Thomas C. Schelling (1957), ‘Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War’ 21. Thomas C. Schelling (1971), ‘Dynamic Models of Segregation’ 22. Thomas C. Schelling (1980), ‘The Intimate Contest for Self-Command’ 23. Thomas C. Schelling (1983), ‘Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command’ 24. Thomas C. Schelling (1984), ‘Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice’ Name Index
