Description
Book SynopsisPresents a range of scholarly analyses of how George Bush and Tony Blair used (or misused) intelligence about WMD in taking their countries to war in Iraq. The study includes original excerpts from speeches and reports on the need to go to war and what subsequently went wrong as well as cutting edge analysis of the decision-making involved.
Table of ContentsList of tables and figures
Acknowledgements
Contributors
1. Introduction: policy-making and intelligence on Iraq – James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian
Part I: Intellectual antecedents of the Iraq War
2. The neoconservative roots of the war in Iraq – John Dumbrell
3. The origins of the British decision to go to war: Tony Blair, humanitarian intervention and the ‘New Doctrine of the International Community’ – Jim Whitman
Part II: The public case for war
4. Did President Bush mislead the country in his arguments for war with Iraq? – James P. Pfiffner
5. The British road to war: decision-making, intelligence and the case for war in Iraq – Mark Phythian
6. Australian use of intelligence and the case for war in Iraq – Rodney Tiffen
7. The Iraq War and the management of American public opinion – John Mueller
Part III: Intelligence failure
8. Intelligence collection and analysis on Iraq: issues for the intelligence community – Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas
9. The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform – Robert Jervis
10. Congress, the Iraq War, and the failures of intelligence oversight – Loch K. Johnson
11. Flawed intelligence, limited oversight: official inquiries into pre-war UK intelligence on Iraq – Mark Phythian
Part IV: Policy failure
12. Decision-making, intelligence, and the Iraq War – James P. Pfiffner
13. Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq – Paul R. Pillar
Part V: Excerpts from key speeches and documents concerning the war
Appendix A: Excerpts from key U.S. speeches before the war in Iraq
Appendix B: Excerpts from key UK speeches and documents before the war in Iraq
Appendix C: October 2002 National Intelligence estimate: key judgments (excerpts)
Appendix D: Excerpts from post-war U.S. investigations
Appendix E: Letter to George Tenet from U.S. intelligence professionals, 28 April 2007
