Description

Book Synopsis
Central bankers like the idea of low inflation, but their actions have a distribution effect of richness. During the 1990s, the independence of central banks increased. What have central banks done with this independence? When we infer that all actors have interests, whether governments, voters or interest groups, why would we assume that central banks are technocratic institutions maximizing the welfare of the state? To answer these questions, this study looks at the Argentinean Central Bank between 1991 and 2007 and researches the incentives of a central bank to act strategically. This book uses a model which is an adaptation of Helmke’s model (2002, 2005) for the Supreme Court of Justice. An inter-temporal conflict of interest explains the Central Bank’s behavior.

Table of Contents
Contents: Independence of Central Bank – Argentinean Central Bank – Inter-temporal conflict of interest – Strategic political behavior – Signaling games

Independence in Crisis: The Argentinean Central

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    A Hardback by Juan Miguel Rodríguez López

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      View other formats and editions of Independence in Crisis: The Argentinean Central by Juan Miguel Rodríguez López

      Publisher: Peter Lang AG
      Publication Date: Publication Date: 19/07/2012
      ISBN13: 9783631638262, 978-3631638262
      ISBN10: 3631638264

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      Central bankers like the idea of low inflation, but their actions have a distribution effect of richness. During the 1990s, the independence of central banks increased. What have central banks done with this independence? When we infer that all actors have interests, whether governments, voters or interest groups, why would we assume that central banks are technocratic institutions maximizing the welfare of the state? To answer these questions, this study looks at the Argentinean Central Bank between 1991 and 2007 and researches the incentives of a central bank to act strategically. This book uses a model which is an adaptation of Helmke’s model (2002, 2005) for the Supreme Court of Justice. An inter-temporal conflict of interest explains the Central Bank’s behavior.

      Table of Contents
      Contents: Independence of Central Bank – Argentinean Central Bank – Inter-temporal conflict of interest – Strategic political behavior – Signaling games

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