Description
Book SynopsisUnlike many other trade regimes, the European Union forbids the use of inter-state retaliation to enforce its obligations, and rules out the use of common ''escape'' mechanisms such as anti-dumping between the EU member states. How does the EU do without these mechanisms that appear so vital to the political viability of other international trade regimes, including the World Trade Organization? How, therefore, is the European legal order, with the European Court of Justice at its centre, able to be so much more binding and intrusive than the legal obligations of many other trade regimes?This book puts forward a new explanation of a key part of the European Union''s legal system, emphasising its break with the inter-state retaliation mechanisms and how Europe''s special form of legal integration is facilitated by intra-industry trade, parliamentary forms of national government, and European welfare states.It argues first that the EU member states have allowed the enforcement of EU oblig
Trade ReviewThis slim book does something difficult. Like a previous and somewhat dated literature, William Phelan's study analyzes a sui generis feature of the EU, but it studies this 'unidentified political object' in terms of a well-established International Relations literature on international regimes and legal interpretations on constitutionalization Phelan addresses the inherent problem of explaining a singular feature of the EU with a comparative analysis between WTO and other trade agreements Brexit has made Phelan's book an extremely topical study. * European Union Studies Association Review of Books *
Table of ContentsIntroduction ; 1. The Puzzle ; 2. The European Legal Order ; 3. Enforcement and Escape in International Trade Politics ; 4. Explaining the EU's Rejection of Inter-State Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies: Analysis ; 5. Explaining the EU's Rejection of Inter-State Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies: Narrative ; Conclusion
