Description
Book SynopsisRachel Cohon offers an original interpretation of the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas. Firstly, his metaethics. Cohon reinterprets Hume''s claim that moral distinctions are not derived from reason and explains why he makes it. She finds that Hume did not actually hold three Humean claims: 1) that beliefs alone cannot move us to act, 2) that evaluative propositions cannot be validly inferred from purely factual propositions, or 3) that moral judgments lack truth value. According to Hume, human beings discern moral virtues and vices by means of feeling or emotion in a way rather like sensing; but this also gives the moral judge a truth-apt idea of a virtue or vice as a felt property. Secondly, Cohon examines the artificial virtues. Hume says that although many virtues are refinements of natural human tendencies, others (such as honesty) are constructed by social convention to make cooperation possible; and some of these generate paradoxes. She argues that Hume sees
Trade ReviewThe position [Cohon] defends and the arguments she deploys should be of interest to anyone interested in Hume's ethics and sentimentalist views generally. It is an excellent addition to the recent flurry of first-rate Hume scholarship. * Guy Fletcher, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 241 (Oct 2010) *
One has to admire the spirit, the inventiveness, the concern for the text, and the engagement with other views that Cohon displays. * Annette C. Baier, Mind 119 d *
the very best book on Hume's ethics * Eric Schliesser, New APPS Blog *
Rachel Cohon provides an excellent, detailed, scholarly and thorough analysis of Hume's moral theory... Her book is a 'must read' for anyone working in Hume's ethics and moral theory generally. * Christine Swanton, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
[a] very fine book ... There is a great deal to be said about Cohon's interpretation. I predict that her book will be a staple of discussion of Hume's ethics for years to come ... Hume's Morality presents a powerful case for a new and important reading of Hume on the artificial virtues, and challenging its conclusions will be very hard work. * James A. Harris, British Journal for the History of Philosophy *
Table of ContentsPART I: FEELING VIRTUE; PART II: FABRICATING VIRTUE
