Description
Book SynopsisThis book argues that human dignity and law stand in a privileged relationship with one another. Law must be understood as limited by the demands made by human dignity. Conversely, human dignity cannot be properly understood without clarifying its interaction with legal institutions and legal practices. This is not, then, a survey of the uses of human dignity in law; it is a rethinking of human dignity in relation to our principles of social governance. The result is a revisionist account of human dignity and law, one focused less on the use of human dignity in our regulations and more on its constitutive implications for the governance of the public realm.
The first part conducts a wide-ranging moral, legal and political analysis of the nature and functions of human dignity. The second part applies that analysis to three fields of legal regulation: international law, transnational law, and domestic public law.
The book will appeal to scholars
Trade Review
This book develops an original revisionist understanding of human dignity. Under this understanding, dignity does not exist prior to or independently of law. Human dignity should be analyzed as a value which lies at the intersection of morality, law and politics. This valuable approach challenges established dogmas and establishes the significance of law as a value-sustaining institution.
Alon Harel, Mizock Professor of Law, The Hebrew University Law Faculty and the Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality
In place of conceptions of human dignity that suffer from normative indeterminacy, regulative redundancy, or constitutive incoherence, Stephen Riley elaborates an account that focuses on the basic status of humans and their entitlements in a network of obligations that ranges across law, politics, morals, and justice. This is a truly impressive work, beautifully written and compellingly argued.
Roger Brownsword, King’s College London and Bournemouth University
This book develops an original revisionist understanding of human dignity. Under this understanding, dignity does not exist prior to or independently of law. Human dignity should be analyzed as a value which lies at the intersection of morality, law and politics. This valuable approach challenges established dogmas and establishes the significance of law as a value-sustaining institution.
Alon Harel, Mizock Professor of Law, The Hebrew University Law Faculty and the Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality
In place of conceptions of human dignity that suffer from normative indeterminacy, regulative redundancy, or constitutive incoherence, Stephen Riley elaborates an account that focuses on the basic status of humans and their entitlements in a network of obligations that ranges across law, politics, morals, and justice. This is a truly impressive work, beautifully written and compellingly argued.
Roger Brownsword (King’s College London and Bournemouth University)
Table of ContentsTable of Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Outline
Part I
Chapter 1 Human Dignity and Law
Chapter 2 Human Dignity as Status
Chapter 3 Human Dignity, Justice, and Institutions
Part II
Chapter 4 International Law
Chapter 5 Transnational Law
Chapter 6 Public Law
