Description
Book SynopsisThe concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck objection: historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck; non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Levy argues that because epistemic conditions on control are so demanding that they are rarely satisfied, agents are not blameworthy for performing actions that they
Trade ReviewHard Luck is important and challenging. Some of the arguments it directs at varieties of compatibilism, especially those concerning control, should generate much useful discussion. And Levy brings empirical research to bear fruitfully on issues like the effects of unconscious attitudes. * Steven Sverdlik, Mind *
[an] impressively wide-ranging book ... a no-frills and honest engagement with the issues by a creative philosopher, and it deserves to be read. * Neal A. Tognazzini, Australasian Journal of Philosophy *
All in all, Hard Luck is good philosophy: informed, clear and controversial. * Brian Jonathan Garrett, Philosophy in Review, (2013), no. 3 *
Table of ContentsPreface and Acknowledgements ; 1. Introduction ; 2. An Account of Luck ; 3. Luck and Libertarianism ; 4. The Luck Problem for Compatibilists ; 5. The Epistemic Dimensions of Control ; 6. Akratic Freedom? ; 7. The Retreat to the Inner Citadel ; 8. Quality Of Will Theories And History-Insensitive Compatibilism ; Bibliography ; Index
