Description
Book SynopsisLaboratory and field experiments have grown significantly in prominence over the past decade. The experimental method provides randomization in key variables therefore permitting a deeper understanding of important economic phenomena. This path-breaking volume provides a valuable collection of experimental work within the area of environmental and resource economics and showcases how laboratory and field experiments can be used for both positive and normative purposes.
The Handbook provides a timely reminder to social scientists, policymakers, international bodies, and practitioners that appropriate decision-making relies on immediate and sharp feedback, both of which are key features of proper experimentation. This book includes a collection of research that makes use of the experimental method to explore key issues within environmental and resource economics that will prove invaluable for both students and academics working in these areas.
Trade Review’Until not much more than 20 years ago, economists frequently lamented the fact that they were limited in their empirical analyses to statistical assessments of market behavior, because controlled economic experiments were (thought to be) infeasible, unethical, or both. Much has changed in the intervening years! In this new volume, John List, Michael Price, and their co-authors provide a diverse set of applications of experimental approaches to the environmental economics realm. This is among the most promising of new areas of research in the economics of the environment, and this book provides a superb point of entry for experts and novices alike.’ -- Robert Stavins, Harvard University
Table of ContentsContents: Introduction John A. List and Michael K. Price PART I: ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES FOR EXPERIMENTAL DATA 1. Quasi-Experiments and Hedonic Property Value Methods Christopher F. Parmeter and Jaren C. Pope 2. Institutional Heterogeneity in Social Dilemma Games: A Bayesian Examination Klaus Moeltner, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund and Maria Alejandra Velez 3. Analyzing Repeated-Game Economics Experiments: Robust Standard Errors for Panel Data with Serial Correlation Christian A. Vossler PART II: NON-MARKET VALUATION 4. Behavioral Foundations of Environmental Economics and Valuation John K. Horowitz, Kenneth E. McConnell and James J. Murphy 5. Values of Gains and Losses: Reference States and Choice of Measure Jack L. Knetsch 6. Value and Outcome Uncertainty as Explanations for the WTA vs WTP Disparity William S. Neilson, Michael McKee and Robert P. Berrens PART III: EMISSIONS TRADING AND AMBIENT TAXES 7. Regulatory Instruments for Monitoring Ambient Pollution Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger 8. Investment Decisions and Emissions Reductions: Results from Experiments in Emissions Trading Lata Gangadharan, Rachel Croson and Alex Farrell 9. Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy and John M. Spraggon PART IV: COMMON POOL RESOURCE GAMES 10. A Tale of Two Carrots: The Effectiveness of Multiple Reward Stages in a Common Pool Resource Game Jan T.R. Stoop, Daan P. van Soest and Jana Vyrastekova 11. Dynamics of Rules and Resources: Three New Field Experiments on Water, Forests, and Fisheries Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Marco Janssen and Francois Bousquet 12. Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts to Support Cooperation? Evidence from Field Experiments in Columbia Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon and John K. Stranlund 13. Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities: An Experimental Evaluation Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger PART V: VOTING AND PUBLIC GOODS 14. Water Managers are Selfish Like Us David Zetland 15. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Providing Environmental Public Goods Katherine Silz Carson 16. The Prisoner’s Dilemma as Intergroup Game: An Experimental Investigation Stephan Kroll, John A. List and Charles F. Mason Index
