Description
Book SynopsisGame theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics. This approach has also enabled the emergence of new areas of enquiry including law and economics, networks, the digital economy, auctions, experimental game theory and many others.
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contributions by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical and industrial organization topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization, and empirical models of research and development.
Authoritative and engaging, this unique Handbook will be an indispensable resource for all serious academics, researchers and students of industrial economics and game theory.
Contributors incude: S. Anderson, A. Barge-Gil, P. Belleflamme, J. Brandts, R. Burguet, L. Corchón, A. Daughety, N. Fabra, R. Fauli-Oller, J.-J. Ganuza, M.l. Gonzalez Maestre, A. Hernando-Veciana, M. Hoffmann, E. Huergo, M. Kopel, L. Lambertini, A. Lopez, M. Marini, C. Marvao, E. Maskin, J.G. Montalvo, L. Moreno, M. Motta, P. Olivella, M. Peitz, M. Pezzino, M. Polo, J. Potters, J. Reinganum, R. Renault, G. Rota Preziosi, J. Sandonis, M. Serena, G. Spagnolo
Trade Review'The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.' --From the foreword by Eric Maskin
'With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. Corchon and Marini have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had and still continues to have on the field of industrial organization over the recent years. Any serious researcher willing to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider to study the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.'
--David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France
Table of ContentsContents: Foreword by Eric Maskin 1. Introduction Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini PART I COLLUSION AND MERGERS 2. Horizontal mergers in oligopoly Ramon Faulí‐Oller and Joel Sandonis 3. Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets Marco A. Marini 4. Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt Catarina Marvão and Giancarlo Spagnolo 5. Assessing coordinated effects in merger cases Natalia Fabra and Massimo Motta PART II CONTESTS 6. Contest theory Luis C. Corchón and Marco Serena 7. Endogenous timing in contests Magnus Hoffmann and Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi PART III SPECIAL TOPICS 8. Firm pricing with consumer search Simon P. Anderson and Régis Renault 9. Market structure, liability, and product safety Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum 10. Strategic delegation in oligopoly Michael Kopel and Mario Pezzino 11. Platforms and network effects Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz 12. Auctions Ángel Hernando-Veciana 13. Differential oligopoly games in environmental and resource economics Luca Lambertini 14. Intellectual property Miguel González‐Maestre 15. Healthcare and health insurance markets Pau Olivella 16. The microeconomics of corruption Roberto Burguet, Juan-José Ganuza and José G. Montalvo PART IV EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 17. Experimental industrial organization Jordi Brandts and Jan Potters 18. Empirical models of firms’ R&D Andrés Barge-Gil, Elena Huergo, Alberto López and Lourdes Moreno Index
