Description
Book SynopsisGame theory is one of the most powerful tools that economists can use to deal with complex economic and policy problems. At the same time, environmental issues are at the heart of many domestic and international policy processes, where interactions among different stakeholders play a crucial role. It is therefore natural to adopt game theory as one of the analytical instruments to enhance our understanding of the interrelations between the economy and the environment, and provide practical suggestions for policy interventions.
This book summarises the latest achievements of researchers involved in the application of game theory to the analysis of environmental matters. It provides an overview of different methods and applications, and gives the reader new insights on the solutions to complex environmental problems. The authors investigate various game theoretic approaches, including cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, and analyse both dynamic and static games. They illustrate the application of these approaches to global and local environmental problems, and present novel but effective tools to support environmental policy making. In particular, they focus on three important issues; climate negotiations and policy, the sharing of environmental costs, and environmental management and pollution control.
This book presents ground-breaking applications of game theory to deal with today's pressing environmental problems. It will become a valuable source of reference for academics and researchers interested in environmental economics and management, game theory and international relations.
Trade Review'. . . the eleven chapters of the book improve the toolbox we have to deal with environmental issues, while at the same time providing some interesting applications and practical solutions to important problems of environmental policy.' -- J.N.R. Jeffers, Sustainable Development
Table of ContentsContents: Introduction Part I: Climate Negotiations and Policy 1. Stable International Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution with Ratification Constraints 2. Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations 3. Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations 4. Kyoto and Beyond Kyoto Climate Policy: Comparison of Open-Loop and Feedback Game Outcomes Part II: Sharing Environmental Costs 5. Cost Sharing in a Joint Project 6. A Model for Cooperative Inter-Municipal Waste Collection: Cost Evaluation Toward Fair Cost Allocation 7. Co-Insurance Games and Environmental Pollution Risk 8. Environmental Effects of Consumption: An Approach Using DEA and Cost Sharing Part III: Environmental Management and Pollution Control 9. Competition and Cooperation in Natural Resources Exploitation: An Evolutionary Game Approach 10. Greenhouse Gases, Quota Exchange and Oligopolistic Competition 11. A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium for Strategic Form Games Index
