Description
Book SynopsisThe essays in this volume explore various issues pertaining to human agency, such as the relationship between free will and causal determinism, and the nature and conditions of moral responsibility.
- Builds on and extends some of the very best recent work in the field.
- Features lively and vigorous debate.
- Forges connections between abstract philosophical theorizing and applied work in neuroscience and even criminal law.
Table of Contents1. Can We Ever Be Really, Truly, Ultimately, Free?
Mark Bernstein 1
2. On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility
Randolph Clark 13
3. Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom
E. J. Coffman and Ted A. Warfield 25
4. Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self
Laura Waddell Ekstrom 45
5. Neurobiology, Neuroimaging, and Free Will
Walter Glannon 68
6. Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question
Steward Goetz 83
7. Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility: Prospects for a Unifying Theory
Ishtiyaque Haji 106
8. Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives
David P. Hunt 126
9. Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will
Alfred R. Mele 146
10. Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet
Michael McKenna 163
11. Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism
Dana K. Nelkin 181
12. Freedom with a Human Face
Timothy O'Connor 207
13. Defending Hard Incompatibilism
Derk Pereboom 228
14. Free Will and Respect for Persons
Saul Smilansky 248
15. PAPistry: Another Defense
Daniel Speak 262
16. The Trouble with Tracing
Manuel Vargas 269
17. Blameworthiness, Non-robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations
David Widerker 292
18. More on "Ought" Implies "Can" and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities 307
Gideon Yaffe 307
