Description
Book SynopsisThe Balkan countries have responded differently to the EU's conditional offer of membership. This book examines the diverging compliance patterns of the Balkan accession states and asks why some of them have complied substantially, some only partially and others have defied the EU.
The book examines the compliance of the Balkan states with the EU accession conditionality, arguing that the variation in the compliance behavior of Balkan governments hinges on three main factors the legitimacy of the EU conditions as seen domestically in the accession states, the costs of compliance and the EU's ability and willingness to use its superior power resources to impose compliance when faced with domestic defiance. Placing important events from the most recent political history of the Balkans in a broader historical perspective, the author evaluates the successes and failures of the EU's state building policies in the Balkans, a geographical area of the highest priority for the EU's fo
Trade Review
In this groundbreaking and exemplary study, Noutcheva explains why Western Balkan states have varied so much in their compliance with the European Union's accession requirements: When matters of national sovereignty and territory are on the table, the EU lacks the legitimacy to impose a solution. Theoretically innovative and empirically rich, this book offers a comprehensive study of the EU's foreign and enlargement policies in the Western Balkans -- and helps us understand the limits of the EU's so-called normative power. - Milada Anna Vachudova, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Table of Contents1. Introduction PART I: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS 2. Europeanizaton and the Compliance Patterns of Balkan States 3. Legitimization and European Foreign Policy PART II: THE DYNAMICS OF EU CONDITIONLAITY 4. The Policy of EU Conditionality in the Balkans 5. The Politics of EU Conditionality PART III: THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE in the balkans 6. The Record of Balkan Compliance with EU Conditionality 7. The Politics of Compliance in the Balkans 8. Conclusion
