Description
Book SynopsisMichael Smith has written a series of essays about the nature of belief and desire, the status of normative judgment, and the relevance of the views we take on both these topics to the accounts we give of our nature as free and responsible agents.
Table of ContentsIntroduction; Part I. Moral Psychology: 1. Internal reasons; 2. The incoherence argument: reply to Schafer-Landau; 3. Philosophy and commonsense: the case of weakness of will; 4. Frog and toad lose control; 5. A theory of freedom and responsibility; 6. Rational capacities; 7(i) On Humeans, anti-humeans and motivation: a reply to Pettit; 7(ii) Humeanism, psychologism, and the normative story; 8. The possibility of philosophy of action; Part II. Meta-Ethics: 9. Moral realism; 10. Objectivity and moral realism: on the significance of the phenomenology of moral experience; 11. In defence of The Moral Problem: a reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord; 12. Exploring the implications of the dispositional theory of value; 13. Does the evaluative supervene on the natural?; 14. Internalism's wheel; 15. Evaluation, uncertainty, and motivation; 16. Ethics and the a priori: a modern parable.
