Description
Book SynopsisThis work stresses the importance, in making any choice of strategies-including the decision to use or refrain from using nuclear weapons-of gauging the intent behind the opponent's military moves. Dr. Brodie also suggests that the use or threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons may lead to de-escalation, that is, may check rather than promote the
Table of Contents*Frontmatter, pg. i*Preface, pg. v*Contents, pg. vii*Introduction, pg. 1*I. Escalatory Fears and the Effectiveness of Local Resistance, pg. 25*II. The Analytical Problem, pg. 37*III. The Relevant Image of the Opponent, pg. 43*IV. The Attenuation of Incentives For "Going First", pg. 63*V. What Is the Enemy Up To?, pg. 69*VI. The Status Quo as a Standard, pg. 75*VII. On Enemy Capabilities Versus Intentions, pg. 85*VIII. The New and Different Europe, pg. 89*IX. How Big an Attack?, pg. 97*X. The "Firebreak" Theory, pg. 103*XI. Predicting the Probabilities of Escalation: Some Sample Cases, pg. 113*Appendix. The Intractability of States: A Distinctive Problem, pg. 135*Index, pg. 149