Description
Book SynopsisThis volume contains contributions to traditional epistemology and to epistemological topics in decision theory by active researchers in the field. Philosophical Perspectives, an annual, aims to publish original essays by foremost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research.
Table of ContentsJessica Brown: Doubt, Circularity, and the Moorean Response to the Sceptic.
Herman Cappelen: Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism.
Albert Casullo: Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification.
Juan Comesana: We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now.
Andy Egan & Adam Elga: I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid.
Richard Feldman: Respecting the Evidence.
Richard Fumerton: Speckled Hens and Objects of Acquaintance.
Alan Hajek: Scotching Dutch Books?.
James M. Joyce: How Probabilities Reflect Evidence.
Thomas Kelly: Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?.
Krista Lawlor: Enough is Enough: Pretense and Invariance in the Semantics of "knows that.".
Jack Lyons: Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks.
Brad Majors & Sarah Sawyer: The Epistemological Argument for Content Externalism.
Christopher J. G. Meacham: Three Proposals Regarding a Theory of Chance.
John L. Pollock & Iris Oved: Vision, Knowledge, and the Mystery Link.
Richard Price: Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint.
Nicholas Silins: Deception and Evidence.
Ted A. Warfield: Knowledge from Falsehood.
Brian Weatherson: Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment?.
Roger White: Epistemic Permissiveness.
