Description
Book SynopsisDuncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject''s rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard''s aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to e
Trade Review[T]his is a clearly written and carefully argued book that has made significant progress in developing and defending episte mological disjunctivism -- it is a must -- read for anyone with interests in the epistemology of perception. * Heather Logue, International Journal for the Study of Skeptiscism *
Table of ContentsPART ONE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM IN OUTLINE; PART TWO: FAVOURING VERSUS DISCRIMINATING EPISTEMIC SUPPORT; PART THREE: RADICAL SCEPTICISM
