Description
Book SynopsisOne of the key supposed ''platitudes'' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don''t know very much, or else that luck is compatible with knowledge after all. In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren''t. Moreover, Pritchard shows that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in contempo
Trade ReviewThis book is a tour de force. * Kevin Meeker, Mind *
Epistemic Luck is a rich, engaging and ground-breaking work. It is a fine example of the kind of original and exciting work being done at the frontier of epistemology today. * Jason Baehr, Metaphilosophy *
A piece of stellar epistemology. * Jon Kvanvig, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research *
Epistemologists commonly say that knowledge excludes luck. But few of us pause to explain what this common saying amounts to, or what truth it contains. Pritchard has paused to do just that, and the result is this fascinating and enjoyable book. In attempting to explain the sense in which knowledge excludes luck, Pritchard both offers a clear and comprehensive survey of much contemporary literature in the theory of knowledge, and also advances the dialectic considerably. If you work in the theory of knowledge, you cannot afford to ignore this book. * Ram Neta, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill *
In this beautifully written book, Duncan Pritchard provides a distinctive defence of a neo-Moorean safety response to scepticism. At the heart of the book is a sensitive and subtle discussion of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. He distinguishes two central kinds of luck which are epistemically relevant and uses them to provide an insightful critique of contemporary virtue epistemology ... Pritchard's admirably clear prose will provide students with an overview of debates at the heart of contemporary epistemology while also making a substantial contribution to those debates. Epistemic Luck will surely be widely read and influential. * Jessica Brown, University of St. Andrews *
Table of ContentsI. SCEPTICISM; II. EPISTEMIC LUCK
