Description
Book SynopsisThis book presents a nonstandard approach to epistemology. Where standard epistemology generally focuses on the certain knowledge the Greeks called epistêmê, the present focus is on some less assured modes of information. Its deliberations will focus on such cognitively suboptimal processes as conjecture, guesswork, and plausible supposition. This shift of focus has implications for virtually every sector of information management, and the book's instigations presented here will explore some of them. Throughout the rule of pragmatic considerations stand in the foreground.As the book's deliberations set out in detail, the nature of our knowledge of reality is inherently conditioned by the fact of its beings the product of what is, at best and at most, a matter of rational guesswork. And so as regards our knowledge, we had best adopt the pragmatic optimism of expectingand hopingthat our best is good enough.
Trade ReviewRescher has a wonderful talent for moving from common sense observations to profound philosophical conclusions in just a few clearly reasoned steps. Here that talent is in full display with an analysis of the various pragmatic mechanisms of rational guesswork, plausible conjecture, analogical reasoning, extrapolation, and inference by explanation that really make up what we rely on as ‘knowledge,’ both scientifically and in our everyday lives. -- Patrick Grim, Stony Brook University
Nicholas Rescher began publishing on epistemology and pragmatism in 1964, and has long been the leading philosopher in the area. This book collects his recent essays in the field, giving special attention to such nonstandard sources of information as rational guesswork and plausible supposition. It highlights Rescher's distinctive focus on the justification of epistemic standards by their utility in shaping our effective practices. Readers will come away with a deeper understanding of the role of pragmatic factors in epistemic evaluation and their compatibility with objectivity and realism. -- Paul K. Moser, Loyola University Chicago
Epistemic Issues in Pragmatic Perspective is an excellent book. Rescher updates his clearest, articulate, and quite wonderful journey through the heart of pragmatic epistemology. In past works he has argued that “truth” as we usually understand it, is not a necessary condition for propositional knowledge about the external world. For the persuasive reasons he urges, there is always some real probability that any of our beliefs about the physical world will be rejected and replaced in the future. Accordingly, the attainment of truth is always, and only an “Aspirational goal” rather than a necessary condition for knowledge providing certainty. What the real world is at any given moment is what the human mind constructs and represents in its most useful pursuits of biological and evolutionary adaptation. In the end he notes that some of our beliefs will be correct descriptions of the world, but our inherent limitations as a species prevent us from deciding once and for all which of our beliefs are closest to our aspirations to truth. -- Robert Almeder, Georgia State University
Table of ContentsPREFACE INTRODUCTION Chapter 1: Sensible Conjecture Chapter 2: Imprecision Chapter 3: Truth-Contextuality and Plausibility Chapter 4: Managing Imperfect Information Chapter 5: Common Sense Chapter 6: Terminating Explanatory Regress Chapter 7: Quantitative Epistemology Chapter 8: On Kinds of Things Chapter 9: Prediction and Knowability Chapter 10: Cognitive Fashions Chapter 11: Problems of Absolute Truth Chapter 12: Unethical Beliefs, Reprehensible Opinions Chapter 13: Culpable Ignorance Chapter 14: Epistemic Triage Chapter 15: Inconceivable Possibilities Chapter 16: Optimalism in Explaining the Nature of Things Chapter 17: Conclusion
